Abstract. We provide protocols for the following two-party problem:
Introduction
Oblivious Transfer (abbrev. OT) refers to several types of two-party protocols where at the beginning of the protocol one party, the Sender (or sometimes Bob or B), has an input and at the end of the protocol the other party, the receiver (or sometime Alice or A), learns some information about this input in a way that does not allow the sender Bob to gure out what she has learned. In particular, in 1-out-of-N OT (OT N 1 ) protocols the sender's input consists of N strings X 1 ; X 2 ; : : : ; X N ; the receiver can choose to get one element X I and does not learn any information about any other string, and the sender does not learn anything about I. Many applications might require the receiver to obliviously obtain several elements held by the sender. It is very ine cient to invoke independent runs of a OT N 1 protocol because of the O(N) overhead of the initialization phase (remember, N might be very large). An e cient protocol for k-out-of-N OT (OT N k ) was described in 23], with complexity which is O(N) for the initialization phase and O(k) OT's for the transfer phase (we omit small logarithmic factors). However, that protocol required the receiver to get all k elements simultaneously. That is to say that she had to decide in advance which k elements to get, and was unable to adaptively pick the elements to be transfered to her 1 .
We present several e cient protocols for k successive (possibly adaptive) oblivious transfers, an operation which we denote as OT N k 1 . The sender has to perform a single initialization of his input, which requires O(N) work. Each transfer requires only about log N OT 2 1 's. In some of the protocols the parameter k does not a ect the complexity, and the protocol can even be used for N successive transfers.
Motivation
OT N k 1 protocols are useful whenever the following three properties are required:
{ A large database should be queried in an adaptive fashion. { The privacy of the the party which performs the queries should be preserved. { The owner of the database does not want to reveal to the other party more than a minimal amount of information. We describe below three applications of this type:
Oblivious search: Bob owns a database which Alice wants to search. Suppose rst that the database is sorted and Alice is using binary search. The two parties can invoke a OT N log N 1 protocol to perform this search without revealing to Bob the element that Alice is searching for, and while limiting Alice's knowledge to log N elements. Alternatively, the data elements can be ordered by a two-level hash, using two hash functions. The rst function maps data elements into bins and the second function further maps the elements that were mapped to the same bin (this is how perfect hash functions 15] are constructed). Our protocols can be used to let Alice obliviously determine whether an element is is in the table. It rst computes by herself the bin to which the element should have been mapped, then performs an oblivious transfer to get the (second) hash function that is used in that bin, and then another oblivious transfer to check the nal location into which the element should have been mapped. 1 The protocol uses several random mappings of the data elements to cryptographic keys. It consists of several stages, and the receiver learns the ith mapping only after stage i ? 1 is complete. For every k data elements that the receiver wishes to learn the protocol guarantees that the probability (taken over the mappings) that she is able to learn another element, is small. However once she knows all the mappings she is able to ask for k data elements that enable her to learn more elements. If this protocol were used for adaptive OT the receiver would have been able to learn all the mappings after the rst transfer phase. Patent or legal databases: Suppose that Bob holds a patent database. He does not want to give the whole database to other parties, but is willing to let other people search the database using a World-Wide-Web interface. Alice has a bright idea which she wants to patent and as a rst step she wants to conduct a search for related patents. She is afraid that if she conducts the search on Bob's database he might learn what she is interested in and might reveal her idea. Alice and Bob can use OT N k 1 to enable Alice to search Bob's database without revealing her queries to him. This solution also applies to searches in legal databases such as Lexis-Nexis or Westlaw.
Medical data: Suppose that Bob holds a database of medical information. For proprietary or privacy reasons Bob does not want to reveal the whole database to other parties but he is willing to let them use it for their research. Alice wants to conduct a research about a certain disease and has a list of patients that have this disease. She wants to search Bob's database for records related to these patients, but cannot reveal their identities to Bob. Alice and Bob can use OT N k 1 to enable Alice to gather the relevant information from Bob's database.
Protocol structure
OT N k 1 protocols contain two phases, for initialization and for transfer.
The initialization phase is run by the sender (Bob) who owns the N data elements. Bob typically computes a commitment to each of the N data elements, with a total overhead of O(N). He then sends the commitments to the receiver (Alice).
The transfer phase is used to transmit a single data element to Alice. At the beginning of each transfer Alice has an input I, and her output at the end of the phase should be data element X I . The transfer phase typically involves the invocation of several OT m 1 protocols, where m is small (either constant or p N).
In these OT's Alice obtains keys which enable her to open the commitment to X I (the protocol uses commitments rather than simple encryptions in order to prevent Bob from changing the data elements between invocations of transfers).
An OT N k 1 protocol supports up to k successive transfer phases.
Correctness and Security De nitions
The de nition of correctness is simple: The sender's input is X 1 ; X 2 ; : : : X N . At each transfer phase j (where 1 j k) the receiver's input is 1 I j N which may depend on all the previous information she learned. At the end of this transfer phase the receiver should obtain X Ij . Note that this implies that the sender essentially commits to his inputs at the beginning of the protocol and cannot change the X's between transfers 2 .
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Our protocols enable the sender to prevent the receiver from obtaining certain data elements at certain times (of course, independently of the items which were previously transferred). It is possible to amend our protocols to ensure an \all or nothing"
The de nition of security is separated into two issues: protecting the receiver and protecting the sender.
The Receiver's Security -Indistinguishability: Given that under normal operation the sender gets no output from the protocol the de nition of the receiver's security in a OT N k 1 protocol is rather simple: for any step 1 t k, for any previous items I 1 ; : : : ; I t?1 that the receiver has obtained in the rst t?1 transfers, for any 1 I t ; I 0 t N and for any probabilistic polynomial time B 0 executing the sender's part, the views that B 0 sees in case the receiver tries to obtain X It and in case the receiver tries to obtain X I 0 t are computationally indistinguishable given X 1 ; X 2 ; : : : X N .
The Sender's Security -Comparison with Ideal Model: Here the issue is a bit trickier, since the receiver (or whatever machine is substituted for her part) gets some information and we want to say that the receiver does not get more or di erent information than she should. We make the comparison to the ideal implementation, using a trusted third party Charlie that gets the sender's input X 1 ; X 2 ; : : : X N and the receiver's requests and gives the receiver the data elements she has requested. Our requirement is that for every probabilistic polynomial-time machine A 0 substituting the receiver there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time machine A 00 that plays the receiver's role in the ideal model such that the outputs of A 0 and A 00 are computationally indistinguishable. This implies that except for X I1 ; : : : ; X I k that the receiver has learned the rest of X 1 ; X 2 ; : : : X N are semantically secure.
Previous work
The notion of 1-out-2 OT (OT 
Comparison to Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) schemes 8] allow a user to access a database consisting of N elements X 1 ; X 2 ; : : : X N and read any element she wishes without the owner learning which element was accessed. Compared to Oblivious Transfer behavior or the sender, i.e. that in each transfer phase he either lets the receiver learn any data element she chooses, or quits the protocol. Note that in any two-party protocol it is impossible to prevent a party from quitting the protocol. protocols, the emphasis in PIR is on the communication complexity which must be o(N). On the other hand, PIR schemes do not protect the owner of the database and do not prevent the user from learning more than a single element.
The rst constructions of PIR schemes were based on using separate databases which do not communicate, but more recent constructions 20, 5] use only a single database. More recently attention was given to the question of protecting the database as well, i.e. that the user will not learn more than a single data element. A PIR scheme that enjoys this property is called SPIR (for Symmetric PIR). In 17] an information theoretic transformation of any PIR scheme into a SPIR scheme was proposed at the cost of increasing the number of servers (and introducing the assumption of a separation between the servers). The OT N 1 protocols of 23] enable a straightforward and e cient transformation of any PIR scheme into a SPIR scheme without increasing the number of database servers.
In 7] PIR schemes with more involved queries (such as keyword retrieval) are discussed.
The OT N k 1 protocols that we introduce would enable even more e cient future transformations from PIR to SPIR. They can be used to transform a protocol for k adaptive invocations of PIR to a protocol for k adaptive invocations of SPIR (currently there are no adaptive PIR protocols, but when such a protocol is introduced it would be possible to immediately transform it to a SPIR protocol).
On a more practical level, we believe that it is preferable to use the computation e cient OT 
Cryptographic Tools
The protocols use three cryptographic primitives, sum consistent synthesizers which are introduced in Section 2.1, 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer, and commitments.
Protocols for 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (OT 2 1 ) can be constructed under a variety of assumptions (see e.g. 3, 16, 1]). Essentially every known suggestion of public-key cryptography allows also to implement OT, (but there is no general theorem that implies this state of a airs). OT can be based on the existence of trapdoor permutations, factoring, the Di e-Hellman assumption (both the search and the decision problems, the latter yields more e cient constructions) and the hardness of nding short vectors in a lattice (the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem). On the other hand, given an OT protocol it is a simple matter to implement secret-key exchange using it. Therefore from the work of Impagliazzo and Rudich 19] it follows that there is no black-box reduction of OT from one-way functions.
Commitment schemes are used to make sure that the sender does not change values between rounds. In a commitment scheme there is a commit phase which we assume to map a random key k and a value x to a string commit k (x), and a reveal phase which in our case would simply be revealing the key k which enables to compute x. The commitment should have the properties that given commit k (x) the value x is indistinguishable from random, and that it is infeasible to generate a commitment yielding two di erent x's. The commitment protocols we use are those of Chaum et al 6] in Section 4, and of Naor 22] in Section 5.
Sum Consistent Synthesizers
Our constructions of OT N k 1 protocols are based on committing to the data elements using pseudo-random synthesizers with a special property, which we call sum consistency. Each transfer phase reveals information which is su cient to reveal just one data element, but cannot be used in conjunction with information from other transfer phases. Sum consistent synthesizers can be constructed based on the Decisional Di e-Hellman assumption or based on a random oracle. We present in Section 4 a OT N k 1 protocol which uses synthesizers based on the Decisional Di e-Hellman assumption. In Section 5 we present a construction of a OT N k 1 protocol based on any sum consistent synthesizer.
Pseudo-random synthesizers: Pseudo-random synthesizers were introduced by Naor and Reingold in 24]. A pseudo-random synthesizer S is an e ciently computable function of`variables x 1 ; : : : ; x`, that satis es the following property: given polynomially-many uniformly distributed assignments to each of its input variables, the output of S on all the combinations of these inputs is pseudorandom. Consider for example a synthesizer S(x; y) with two inputs. Then for random sets of inputs hx 1 ; : : : ; x m i; hy 1 ; : : : ; y m i, the set fS(x i ; y j )j1 i; j mg (which contains m 2 elements) is pseudo-random. That is to say that this set is indistinguishable from a truly random set 3 . We use this property of synthesizers in order to encrypt the data elements. For example, the elements can be arranged in a square and a random key could be attached to every row and every column (say, key R i to row i, and key C j to column j). The element in position (i; j) can be committed to using the combined key S(R i ; C j ). It is ensured that the values of any set of combined keys do not leak information about the values of other combined keys.
We require an additional property from the pseudo-random synthesizers that we use: they should have the same output for any two input vectors for which the sum of the input variables is the same. For example, for a two dimensional synthesizer S this implies that for every x 1 ; y 1 ; x 2 ; y 2 that satisfy x 1 +y 1 = x 2 +y 2 it holds that S(x 1 ; y 1 ) = S(x 2 ; y 2 ). More formally, the requirement is as follows:
De nition 1 ((sum consistent synthesizer)). A function S (de ned overì nputs in a commutative group) is a sum consistent synthesizer if the following two conditions hold: { S is a pseudo-random synthesizer. { For every x 1 ; : : : ; x`, and every y 1 ; : : : ; y`that satisfy P1 x i = P1 y i , it holds that S(x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x`) = S(y 1 ; y 2 ; : : : ; y`)
The sum consistency property does not contradict the pseudo-randomness of the synthesizer. Suppose that S is a two dimensional sum consistent synthesizer, and let hx 1 ; : : : ; x m i and hy 1 ; : : : ; y m i be two random sets of inputs, whose size is polynomial in the security parameter of the synthesizer. Then there is an exponentially small probability that there is a pair (x i ; y j ); (x 0 i ; y 0 j ) for which x i + y j = x 0 i + y 0 j . If`is large enough then an`dimensional synthesizer might contain such pairs with non-negligible probability. However then the range of possible`-tuple inputs is exponentially large, and the probability of sampling such a pair is exponentially small. Construction 1 (Random oracle based sum consistent synthesizer) Let RO be a random oracle. A sum consistent synthesizer can be realized as S(x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x`) = RO(x 1 + x 2 + + x`)
This simple construction means that (1) it is plausible to assume that such functions exist, and (2) suggests a heuristic approach for constructing such functions using a \complex" function (e.g. MD5). We prefer the number-theoretic construction that we present next, but on the downside it requires modular exponentiations which are more complicated to compute than common realizations of \complex" functions. Another construction of sum consistent synthesizers is based on the synthesizers of 25] whose security relies on the Decisional Di e-Hellman assumption (the DDH assumption is introduced and discussed in Section 4.1 below) 4 . Construction 2 (DDH based sum consistent synthesizer) Let hG g ; gi be a group and a generator for which the Decisional Di e-Hellman assumption holds. Let the input values x 1 ; : : : ; x`be elements in f1; : : : ; jG g jg. A sum consistent synthesizer can be realized as S(x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x`) = g x1x2 x4
In fact, in the usual representation it seems that these synthesizers have the same output for input vectors for which the multiplication of the input elements is equal. It is possible to look at a di erent representation of the inputs which results in the same outputs for sum consistent inputs. Both representations are su cient for our purposes.
We use sum consistent synthesizers S in the following way which is depicted in Figure 1 . Suppose that the elements are arranged as entries in a square and are committed to using S(R i ; C j ), as described above. Then for each transfer phase Bob can choose a random value r, and let Alice obtain one of the values hR 1 +r; R 2 +r; : : : ; R p N +ri, and one of the values hC 1 ?r; C 2 ?r; : : : ; C p N ?ri. Alice can compute S(R i + r; C j ? r) = S(R i ; C j ) and obtain the key that hides data element (i; j). We should also make sure that Alice is unable to combine the values she obtains in di erent transfer phases, and this requirement complicates the protocols a little. We present two types of OT N k 1 protocols of the above avor, protocols whose security depend on the Decisional Di e-Hellman assumption, and protocols which can be based on any sum consistent synthesizer. We start with two DDH based protocols. These protocols are somewhat simpler than the general construction, since the hardness of the discrete log problem prevents some attacks which are possible in the general case. The DDH based protocols can be used to transfer any number of elements. That is, they are good for OT N k 1 with any k < N, and their e ciency does not depend on k. We then present a OT N k 1 protocol based on any sum consistent synthesizer. This protocol is secure for at most k transfers, where k is a parameter which a ects (logarithmically) the complexity of the protocol.
Protocols based on the Decisional Di e-Hellman Assumption
Following we present two protocols which are based on the Decisional Di eHellman assumption. The protocols are very e cient, except that the basic operation they use is an exponentiation in a group in which the DDH assumption holds.
The Decisional Di e-Hellman assumption
The Decisional Di e-Hellman assumption (DDH assumption) is used as the underlying security assumption of many cryptographic protocols (e.g. Our protocols essentially commit to the data elements using a key which is the output of the DDH based pseudo-random function or synthesizer of 25].
They are de ned for a group G g which is generated by a generator g, and for which the Decisional Di e-Hellman assumption holds. It is very attractive to use in these protocols the non-interactive OT 
A two-dimensional protocol
The following protocol arranges the elements in a two-dimensional structure of size Protocol 1 B's input is X 1 ; X 2 ; :::X N , where N = 2`. Rename these inputs as fx i;j j1 i; j p
Ng. In each invocation of the protocol the receiver A should learn a di erent element X i;j . 2. Transfer (this part takes place when A wants to learn X i;j ).
For each X i;j that A wants to learn the parties invoke the following protocol: (a) B chooses random elements r R ; r C (r R is used to randomize the row keys, and r C is used to randomize the column keys). The receiver can clearly obtain any value she wishes to receive in the above protocol (the sum consistency ensures that she reconstructs the same key that was used by B for the commitment).
As for the complexity of the protocol, the initialization phase requires B to compute all N commitment keys, i.e. to compute N exponentiations (see in protocol 2 a discussion on how to e ciently implement these exponentiations by utilizing the structure of the exponents). Each transfer phase requires two invocations of an OT The security of B is guaranteed by the Decisional Di e-Hellman assumption. To show this we compare A to a party A 0 who instead of running the transfer phases simply asks and receives the keys for k commitments. We prove that A does not gain more information than A 0 . To complete the proof of security it is required to simulate A 0 and show that she does not learn more than k committed values. We present a theorem which states the security property and a sketch of its proof. The formal proof of this property turns out to be rather subtle since it involves the problem of selective decommitment which is described below. ; R i r 1 ; C j r 2 ), where r1; r 2 were chosen at random by B. This is equivalent to A learning a triplet V 2 = (g RiCj=r1r2 ; r 1 ; r 2 ). A can easily compute from this information the following tuple V 3 = (g RiCj ; g RiCj=r1r2 ; r 1 ; r 2 ) which of course does not contain more information than the key g RiCj alone (the key enables A to generate tuples in the same distribution as that of V 3 ). The pseudorandomness of the output of the synthesizer ensures that A does not gain from k such keys more information about other keys than is available to A 0 which simply asks and receives k keys. It is left to prove that A does not learn anything from the commitments that she is given. This proof involves the selective decommitment problem, which we describe below.
The selective decommitment problem and its resolution: Consider the following seemingly benign problem. A party A receives N commitments to N values. She then chooses k of the commitments, receives their keys, and opens them. It seems obvious that A does not gain information on the unopened values. A should therefore be simulated in the ideal model by a party who can ask and get k of the committed values and sees nothing else. Although there does not seem to be any obvious way for A to take advantage of the fact that she sees the commitments before asking for the keys, it is not known how to prove that this is indeed the case. The problem is that it is hard to simulate the operation of A since it is unknown at the time of generating the commitments which of them she would ask to open. The number of the possible subsets of k commitments whose keys A might request is exponential. Note that it is possible to prove that A does not learn information about any other single element (or about a constant number of elements) since the simulation can with high probability \guess" the identity of this element. The selective decommitment problem is discussed in 13].
To enable the simulation it should be possible to open in the simulation any commitment to any value. Luckily, in the scenario of the OT N k 1 there is an easy way to enable this. We describe below the solution for the DDH based protocol, which uses the trapdoor commitments of Chaum et al 6]. The solution for the protocols which use any sum consistent synthesizer is more complex and uses the commitments of Naor 22] . We do not describe it here.
In the case of DDH based OT N k 1 the protocol should be amended as follows (but for the sake of clarity we do not describe these modi cations in the body of the protocols in the paper): (1) In the beginning of the protocol A should send to B two values g 1 ; g 2 2 G and prove (in zero-knowledge) that she knows the discrete log of g 2 to the base g 1 . (In the simulation we would extract log g1 g 2 of the g 1 ; g 2 that would be used there). (ii) takes the output of the synthesizer and uses it as a key to encrypt (X I ; Y I ) by xoring it, and sends these two results to A.
When the output of the synthesizer is computed it can be used to compute X I and the commitment can be used to verify the result. In the simulation it is possible given X I to nd a Y I which would be consistent with it, and give an output of the synthesizer which \decrypts" these values.
4.3 A protocol using OT 2 1 :
The following protocol uses simple OT The receiver can clearly obtain any value she wishes to receive in the above transfer protocol.
The initialization phase requires B to compute all N commitment keys. This can be done with exactly N exponentiations if the order in which the keys are computed follows a Gray code (i.e. the Hamming distance between each two consecutive words is 1). The computation can be further improved by using e cient techniques for raising the same number to many powers, or for raising many numbers to the same exponent (see 21] for a survey of such techniques). It is an interesting problem to nd a way to utilize the special structure of the exponents (being the multiplications of all the subsets of`elements) to compute the N = 2`commitment keys more e ciently.
The transfer part of the protocol requires`= log N invocations of an OT 2 1 protocol. In addition A and B should each compute a single exponentiation. The privacy of A is guaranteed by the privacy of the OT 2 1 protocols. A is also ensured by the security properties of the commitments that B cannot change the values of the X I 's between transfers.
The security of B is guaranteed by the Decisional Di e-Hellman assumption, and is proven in a similar way to the security of protocol 1.
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Note that B can set every a 0 j to be equal to 1 without a ecting the security of the system. This results in a reduction in the size of the keys that B needs to keep.
Protocols Based on Any Sum Consistent Synthesizer
We describe an insecure OT N k 1 protocol which can be based on any sum consistent synthesizer, examine it, and transform it to a secure protocol.
An Insecure Protocol
The following protocol is insecure. Protocol 3 (an insecure protocol) B's input is fx i;j j1 i; j p
Ng. Let S(x; y) be a sum consistent synthesizer with two inputs. 
Transfer:
The parties invoke the following protocol for each X i;j that A wants to learn: (a) B chooses random elements r R ; r C , such that r R + r C = 0 (r R is used to randomize the row keys, and r C is used to randomize the column keys). The security problem: The above protocol enables A to learn any value she wishes and protects her privacy. However the protocol is insecure for B because A can combine information she learns in di erent transfers, and use linear relations between the keys to learn more keys than she is entitled to. For example she can use the relation (R i + C j ) + (R i 0 + C j 0 ) = (R i 0 + C j ) + (R i + C j 0 ). She can thus ask to learn the keys that generate K i;j ; K i 0 ;j , and K i;j 0 and use the information she receives to illegally compute the key K i 0 ;j 0 .
Fixing the protocol
In order to transform the above protocol to be secure we use the following construction of a set of matrices. It is used to ensure the non-linearity of the information that A learns. Consider a set of k+1 linearly dependent vectors. Then each coordinate either has no vectors in which it is set to 1, or it is set to 1 in at least two vectors.
Therefore in each region the 1 values of all k + 1 vectors are concentrated in at most (k + 1)=2 coordinates. Since the mapping to matrices locations is random the probability that this property holds for a single region is at most ( k+1 . The probability that it holds for all regions is therefore bounded by ( k+1 it su ces to use t = 4. It should be interesting to come up with an explicit construction of k-out-n relation free matrices (the problem seems to be related to the minimal weight of linear codes).
The transformation of protocol 3 is based on mapping the data elements to keys using a set of k-out-of-n relation free matrices. This ensures that the receiver can learn at most k linear equations which correspond to k relevant synthesizer inputs. The full description of the secure protocol appears in Section 5.3. We rst describe only the di erences from protocol 3.
In the initialization phase B uses a k-out-of-N relation free construction of t matrices and maps the N elements to entries in the t matrices. Namely, the element whose index is x is mapped in each matrix to the entry which contains x. The sender publishes the mapping and makes it available to A. B chooses random keys for every row and column from each matrix (a total of 2t p n keys). The commitment key for each element is the output of a sum consistent synthesizer with 2t inputs, which are the keys corresponding to the rows and columns to which the element is mapped in each of the matrices. The protocol is run with t matrices which are k-out-of-n relation free. B uses in each transfer phase a new set of 2t random hiding elements, r i , which sum to 0. Therefore A can learn in each transfer phase at most a single linear equation which does not involve the hiding elements. This equation is the sum of one key from each row and from each column.
In order to avoid the selective decommitment problem we present the proof assuming that B generated N encryptions of the data items, and not commitments. The proof for a protocol which uses commitments is more involved and uses the commitments of 22].
First assume that in each transfer phase A follows the protocol and learns an equation which corresponds to a key which was used to encrypt a data element.
The relation freeness ensures that the k equations that A learns do not span any key which was used for encrypting another data element.
Note that for every synthesizer output that A obtains she also learns the sum of its inputs. In order to handle this in the simulation the encryptions there should be done with a di erent set of keys for each data element. I.e. instead of using 2t p N keys there would be N sets of 2t keys, so that the Ith set is used for encrypting to X I . When A asks in the simulation for element X I she receives the sum of the keys in the Ith set. The pseudo-randomness of the synthesizer ensures that she cannot distinguish this view from the real distribution.
Consider now the case in which A does not play by the rules and in some transfer phases asks to learn linear equations which do not correspond to any of the encryption keys. Then in some later transfer phase she might learn an equation which, together with the previous equations she learned, reveals several keys. This might pose a problem in the simulation since it would be required to supply A with a single value which agrees with all the keys that she is supposed to learn in this phase. However observe that the j equations that A learns in the rst j transfer phases span a subspace of dimension j of the N equations that were used for the encryptions. The value that A obtains in the jth phase of the simulation could be set to correspond to a new vector of this subspace which is learned by A in this phase . 2 
A Protocol Based on Any Sum Consistent Synthesizer
The following protocol is a secure version of protocol 3.
Protocol 4 B's input contains the N elements fx i;j j1 i; j p
Ng. B maps the inputs into a set of k-out-of-N relation free matrices, which contains t matrices. Let x m R and x m C denote the row and column into which x is mapped in matrix m.
Let S(x 1 ; : : : ; x 2t ) be a sum consistent synthesizer with 2t inputs. and uses it to open the commitment Y i;j and reveal X i;j .
